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The treaty-making authority in the U.S. Constitution is found in Article 
II, Section 2, Clause 2 and states, “He [the President] shall have Power, by 
and with Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur[.]”1  Article VI also refers to treaties 
and states that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land[.]”2 
That the federal treaty-making authority is constrained by the other parts 
of the Constitution does not sound like the stuff of law journals.  It seems 
like common sense.  After all, we would not expect someone to argue that 
                                                
 * Steve Voigt is Counsel with a large law firm having a worldwide reach.  Steve is the 
six-time recipient of the Rising Star award from the Super Lawyers and is one of thirty-five 
lawyers in Pennsylvania selected by The Legal Intelligencer and the Pennsylvania Law Weekly 
as a “2007 Lawyer on the Fast Track.”  Steve’s articles and writings have appeared in 
numerous journals, on the Internet, and in newspapers.  The opinions expressed herein belong 
solely to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s firm or any other 
individual. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
 2. Id. art. VI, cl. 4. 
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the ability to “regulate Commerce”3 entitles Congress to disregard the Third 
Amendment and quarter soldiers in our houses.  We would not expect to see 
an argument that the power to “establish Post Offices”4 enables Congress to 
disregard the freedom of the press in the First Amendment.  So, why is the 
Tenth Amendment so fully disregarded with respect to treaties? 
What the federal government is authorized to do under the treaty-making 
power is not limitless.5  This power was intended to be constrained by the 
other parts of the Constitution and the fundamental concept of federalism 
itself that was embodied in the Tenth Amendment.6   
This brings us to an initial question.  Who really cares?  Is there really 
much of a danger of unconstitutional treaties influencing domestic state 
policy?  The answer is yes.  As I previously have written, the International 
Criminal Court is antagonistic to the Constitution and could, if ratified, affect 
domestic criminal trials and prosecution.7  There are other examples of 
contrary burgeoning foreign and international law.  In 2009, various Islamic 
nations proposed a non-binding U.N. resolution defining the questioning of 
                                                
 3. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 4. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 5. See generally HADLEY ARKES, FIRST THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES 
OF MORALS AND JUSTICE 31–32 (Princeton Univ. Press 1986) (“Republican government is first 
and foremost a government of law, a constitutional order.  It might be said that its first maxim, 
arising from the logic of morals itself, is that people in positions of authority should be 
compelled to cite some law beyond their own self-interest as the ground of their official 
acts.”). 
 6. See William E. Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and 
Senate of the United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 435, 439–40 (1909) (“A treaty then may 
possibly be unconstitutional in any of the following cases: (1) If it alters the form of our 
government; (2) If it alters the general departmental construction of the government; (3) If it 
changes the constitution of any of the departments; (4) If it deprives the federal government or 
any of its departments of its delegated powers, or transfers such power to another department; 
(5) If it seeks to exercise a power confided to another department of the federal government; 
(6) If by it it is sought to exercise a power prohibited to the federal government or reserved to 
the States.”).  There is more reserved to individuals and states than the Bill of Rights and the 
mere right to govern.  HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 73 (Princeton Univ. Press 
1990) (“To pick out certain uses of freedom, such as speech and assembly, for a special 
mention in the Constitution, runs the risk then of disparaging, by implication, the freedoms 
that have not been mentioned.  That was the warning posted by the Federalists, and we would 
be obliged to consider seriously whether their fears have not in fact been borne out.”). 
 7. See Steven T. Voigt, The International Criminal Court’s Antagonism to Our 
Constitution and Our Need to Articulate an Alternative, in THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES 
TRIALS AND THEIR POLICY CONSEQUENCES TODAY 157, 162–64 (Beth Griech-Polelle ed., 
2009) (stating “[a]n American tried before the ICC could be denied the right to a speedy and 
public trial, reasonable bail, and protection from cruel and unusual punishment, due process 
protections found in Amendments VI and VIII of the Constitution” and “the ICC will have the 
authority to second-guess trials in the U.S.”).  
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Islam as a human rights violation.8  The Alliance Defending Freedom reports 
that in Europe 
 
[t]here are unprecedented international attacks on rights of 
conscience and religious expression from so-called “hate 
speech” regulations, allegedly designed to protect listeners 
from “hurtful” expressions.  These laws have been used 
specifically and repeatedly to censor and restrict traditional 
Christian expression.  The basis of these laws as applied is 
simple: any speech that any listener finds “offensive” is 
banned.  Not surprisingly, Christian religious speech is often 
singled out for elimination.9 
 
The 2013 U.N. Arms Trade Treaty10 includes startling “national 
control”11 and “record keeping”12 provisions that would likely conflict with 
the Second Amendment and similar protections in the constitutions of the 
various states.13  If ever converted into a treaty, the U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development, Agenda 21, would drastically affect local 
land use and clash with private property rights.14  There are many more 
                                                
 8. Proposal at U.N. to Criminalize “Defamation of Islam,” U.N. WATCH (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.1289203/apps/s/content.asp?ct=6831 
061. 
 9. The Threat of the ACLU, Planned Parenthood, and Their Radical International Allies, 
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/issues/global (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2013) (emphases in original). 
 10. Arms Trade Treaty, adopted Apr. 2, 2013, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/ 
04/20130410%2012-01%20PM/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf #page=21 (ratification pending). 
 11. Id. art. 5, para. 3. 
 12. Id. art. 10, para. 1–2. 
 13. By way of example regarding state constitutions, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution states, “[t]he right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the 
State shall not be questioned.”  PA. CONST. art. 1, § 21.  Regarding the Arms Trade Treaty and 
the Second Amendment, former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton has warned, “[g]un-control 
advocates will use these provisions to argue that the U.S. must enact measures such as a 
national gun registry, licenses for guns and ammunition sales, universal background checks, 
and even a ban of certain weapons.  The treaty thus provides the Obama administration with 
an end-run around Congress to reach these gun-control holy grails.”  John Bolton & John Yoo, 
Obama’s United Nations Backdoor to Gun Control, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2013, 6:06 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324504704578413110123095782.html. 
 14. See U.N. Sustainable Development, Agenda 21 from the U.N. Conference on 
Environment & Development, §§ 10.5–10.6 (June 1992), available at 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf (stating in part that, 
“[t]he broad objective is to facilitate allocation of land to the uses that provide the greatest 
sustainable benefits” and “[g]overnments at the appropriate level, with the support of regional 
and international organizations, should ensure that policies and policy instruments support the 
best possible land use and sustainable management of land resources”). 
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examples of divergent foreign laws and resolutions, and it is not such a big 
step for ratification of any of them as a treaty.  All it takes is a willing foreign 
partner, a President, and a Senate. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the scope of the treaty power 
only in a couple instances and in those cases the Court has adopted an 
expansive view of the power.  Sadly, the Supreme Court and other courts 
have an academically dishonest record of deciding the meaning of 
constitutional provisions—including this one—with no or virtually no 
exploration of original intent. 
 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S EXPANSIVE VIEW OF THE  
TREATY-MAKING AUTHORITY 
 
One of the foremost U.S. Supreme Court decisions discussing the 
domestic reach of the federal treaty authority was in 1920 in Missouri v. 
Holland.15  The state of Missouri had challenged a 1916 treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain, which provided for protection to migrating 
birds within the United States, and federal regulations giving effect to the 
terms of the treaty.16  The treaty and regulations pursuant to it “prohibited the 
killing, capturing or selling any of [particular] migratory birds . . . except as 
permitted by regulations compatible with those terms, to be made by the 
Secretary of Agriculture.”17 
Missouri asserted that the federal government’s actions were “an 
unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the 
Tenth Amendment, and that the acts of the defendant done and threatened 
under that authority invade the sovereign right of the State and contravene its 
will manifested in statutes.”18  It argued that “what an act of Congress could 
not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty 
cannot do.”19  The Supreme Court heard the case and decided that the bird 
migration treaty was a constitutional application of the treaty power and 
unaffected by the Tenth Amendment.20   
The Missouri Court’s rationale was a classic example of the living 
Constitution doctrine.  The Supreme Court held that the original intent for the 
Tenth Amendment does not control the Tenth Amendment’s application.21  
                                                
 15. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).   
 16. Id. at 430–31. 
 17. Id. at 431–32. 
 18. Id. at 431. 
 19. Id. at 432. 
 20.  Id. at 435.   
 21. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433 (stating that “[t]he case before us must be considered in light 
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago”). 
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Instead, the Court said, “[w]e must consider what this country has become in 
deciding what that amendment has reserved.”22  In other ways, the judicial 
reasoning in Missouri is antithetical to original intent.  First, the Court held 
that the treaty was not “forbidden by some invisible radiation from the 
general terms of the Tenth Amendment.”23  This “invisible radiation” 
phraseology depicts the Tenth Amendment as though the entire catalog of 
states’ rights must somehow be articulated to be reserved.  In addition, the 
Court suggested that the treaty power might extend even beyond other 
constitutional powers, stating it is “obvious” there may be situations “that an 
act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act 
could[.]”24 
Two decades after Missouri, the Supreme Court again opined that the 
Tenth Amendment is essentially irrelevant to the scope of federal power.  In 
the 1941 case United States v. Darby,25 the Court decided that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, requiring employers to conform to federal wage and hour 
requirements for employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate 
commerce, was a valid exercise of the constitutional authority under the 
Commerce Clause.26  In reaching this decision, the Court called the Tenth 
Amendment “but a truism,” stating “[t]he amendment states but a truism that 
all is retained which has not been surrendered.  There is nothing in the 
history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the 
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been 
established by the Constitution[.]”27 
While Darby did not involve a treaty, the Supreme Court relied on Darby 
in the next major treaty power case, the 1947 case of Reid v. Covert.28  The 
Reid Court, citing Darby and Missouri, stated that while the treaty power has 
constitutional limitations, it is not limited by states’ rights.29 
In Reid, the Supreme Court considered the jurisdiction of two military 
court-martials over two civilian dependents of armed services personnel for 
the alleged murders of servicemen stationed in Great Britain.30  At the time 
of the alleged offenses, the United States and Great Britain had an executive 
agreement permitting the “United States’ military courts to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by [service 
                                                
 22. Id. at 434.   
 23. Id. at 433–34. 
 24. Id. at 433. 
 25. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  
 26. Id. at 125–26. 
 27. Id. at 124. 
 28. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).   
 29. Id. at 18. 
 30. Id. at 3–5.  
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members] or their dependents.”31  The Supreme Court held that the military 
trials would have lacked many of the safeguards in the Bill of Rights and the 
military did not have jurisdiction over the civilian dependents.32   
The Court rejected the argument that the federal treaty-making power 
superseded the other provisions of the Constitution, holding, “[t]his Court 
has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution 
over a treaty.”33  The Court observed that legislation is equivalent in 
authority to treaties: 
 
This Court has also repeatedly taken the position that an 
Act of Congress, which must comply with the Constitution, 
is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which 
is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute 
to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.  It would be 
completely anomalous to say that a treaty need not comply 
with the Constitution when such an agreement can be 
overridden by a statute that must conform to that 
instrument.34   
 
In discussing the Tenth Amendment, however, the Court, citing Missouri and 
Darby, stated that the Tenth Amendment “is no barrier” to the scope of 
treaties that are “validly” made.35  
What are we to make of Missouri and Reid’s explanation of the treaty 
authority?  It would appear from Missouri and Reid that the Supreme 
Court—at least historically—has viewed the Tenth Amendment as no 
limitation whatsoever to the treaty power or otherwise as a mere declaration 
of the relationship between the states and the federal government.  If that is 
really true, however, how can this power be squared with the Reid Court’s 
“recogni[tion of] the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty”36 or its 
proscription that 
 
[i]t would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those 
who created the Constitution, as well as those who were 
responsible for the Bill of Rights—let alone alien to our 
entire constitutional history and tradition—to construe 
Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power 
                                                
 31. Id. at 15.   
 32. Id. at 39–41. 
 33. Id. at 17.   
 34. 354 U.S. at 18 (footnote omitted). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 17.   
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under an international agreement without observing 
constitutional prohibitions.37  
 
And what can we make of the Reid Court’s claim that “[t]here is nothing 
in [Missouri] which is contrary to the position taken here”?38  As the Court in 
Reid stated: 
 
The [Missouri] Court was concerned with the Tenth 
Amendment which reserves to the States or the people all 
power not delegated to the National Government.  To the 
extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the 
people and the States have delegated their power to the 
National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no 
barrier.39 
 
What is meant by “validly made” and “delegated”?  If “validly made” 
only refers to whether there was adherence to proper procedure rather than 
adherence to other constitutional prohibitions, is this remotely consistent 
with the original intent of our Founding Fathers?  Could our Founding 
Fathers have possibly intended for there to be no limitation on the subject 
matter of treaties because, after all, the treaty-making authority was a 
“delegated power” given to the federal government?  Is it conceivable that 
our Founding Fathers wanted the federal government to govern internal 
affairs of states, so long as this was preceded by a treaty with a willing 
partner abroad?   
 
II.  DID OUR FOUNDING FATHERS INTEND FOR A LIMITLESS SCOPE  
OF THE TREATY POWER? 
 
The answer in short is “no.”  In fact, an examination of the writings and 
oratories of our Founding Fathers on this topic—which is unfortunately 
absent from Missouri, Darby, and Reid—puts the answer in plain sight.  The 
Constitution was only ratified based on an understanding that the federal 
treaty authority indeed had limitations.  Sadly, far-reaching jurisprudence has 
arisen from our courts, including the Supreme Court, without any 
consideration whatsoever of this history, original intent, or the reasoning 
under which the very document was ratified. 
                                                
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 18. 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
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A. The Virginia Convention 
 
The most significant discussion of the treaty power took place during 
Virginia’s ratifying convention.  There, George Mason and Patrick Henry 
raised concerns about the treaty authority.  Their first objection was that there 
was no bill of rights that would constrain the treaty power.40  Recall that the 
Constitution went into effect on March 4, 1789, without a Bill of Rights.  The 
first ten amendments were only later ratified on December 15, 1791.  Mason 
and Henry argued that even though the Constitution delegated only specific 
powers to the federal government, the Constitution nevertheless needed a Bill 
of Rights as an additional safeguard for the rights held by the people.  Mason 
stated: 
 
Though the king [of England] can make treaties, yet he 
cannot make a treaty contrary to the constitution of his 
country.  Where did their constitution originate?  It is 
founded on a number of maxims, which, by long time, are 
rendered sacred and inviolable.  Where are there such 
maxims in the American Constitution?41 
 
Likewise, Henry asserted: 
 
I dread that our rights are about to be given away, though I 
may possibly be mistaken. . . .  
. . . When a person shall be treated in the most horrid 
manner, and most cruelly and inhumanly tortured, will the 
security of territorial rights grant him redress? . . . 
I might go on in this discrimination; but it is too obvious  
that the security of territory is no security of individual 
safety.  I ask, How are the state rights, individual rights, and 
national rights, secured?  Not as in England; for the authority 
quoted from Blackstone would, if stated right prove, in a 
thousand instances, that, if the king of England attempted to 
take away the rights of individuals, the law would stand 
against him.  The acts of Parliament would stand in his way.  
The bill and declaration of rights would be against him.  The 
common law is fortified by the bill of rights. . . .  If you look 
                                                
 40. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 508, 512–13 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) 
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
 41. Id. at 508 (emphases added) (reporting remarks of George Mason at the Virginia 
convention). 
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for a similar security in the paper on your table, you look in 
vain.  That paper is defective without such a declaration of 
rights.  It is unbounded without such restrictions. . . .  The 
rights of persons are exposed as it stands now.42 
 
Henry and Mason also expressed concern that the treaty-making 
authority could interfere with the rights of states.43  Their primary concern 
was the federal government ceding territory of individual states to foreign 
powers under this power.  Henry said: 
 
We are told that the state rights are preserved.  Suppose 
the state right to territory be preserved; I ask and demand, 
How do the rights of persons stand, when they have power to 
make any treaty, and that treaty is paramount to 
constitutions, laws, and every thing? . . .  
. . . If the Constitution be paramount, how are the 
constitutions and laws of the states to stand?  Their operation 
will be totally controlled by it; for it is paramount to every 




Will any gentleman say that they may not make a treaty, 
whereby the subjects of France, England, and other powers, 
may buy what lands they please in this country? . . . We wish 
an express and explicit declaration, in that paper, that the 
power which can make other treaties cannot, without the 
consent of the national Parliament—the national 
legislature—dismember the empire.45   
 
James Madison, Governor Edmund Randolph, George Nicholas, and 
Francis Corbin responded to the objections by Patrick Henry and George 
Mason by assuring the Virginia Convention that the treaty power was limited 
only to “external affairs” and treaties could not infringe on states’ rights or 
individuals’ rights.  Corbin “contended that the empire could not be 
                                                
 42. Id. at 512–13 (reporting remarks of Patrick Henry at the Virginia convention). 
 43. See id. at 509, 512–13. 
 44. Id. at 512–13 (emphasis added) (reporting remarks of Patrick Henry at the Virginia 
convention). 
 45. Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (reporting remarks of George Mason at the Virginia 
convention). 
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dismembered without the consent of the part dismembered.”46  Madison 
stated: 
 
I do not conceive that power is given to the President and 
Senate to dismember the empire, or to alienate any great, 
essential right.  I do not think the whole legislative authority 
have this power.  The exercise of the power must be 
consistent with the object of the delegation.  
. . . The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse 




I conceive that neither the life nor property of any citizen, 
nor the particular right of any state, can be affected by a 
treaty. . . .  
. . . Will not the President and Senate be restrained?  
Being creatures of that Constitution, can they destroy it?  
Can any particular body, instituted for a particular purpose, 
destroy the existence of the society for whose benefit it is 
created? . . . When the Constitution marks out the powers to 
be exercised by particular departments, I say no innovation 
can take place.48  
 
As did Nicholas: 
 
The worthy member says, that they can make a treaty 
relinquishing our rights, and inflicting punishments; because 
all treaties are declared paramount to the constitutions and 
laws of the states.  An attentive consideration of this will 
show the committee that they can do no such thing.  The 
provision of the 6th article is, that this Constitution, and the 
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof, and all the treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land.  They can, by this, make no treaty which 
                                                
 46. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 509 (emphasis added) (reporting remarks of 
Corbin at the Virginia convention). 
 47. Id. at 514 (emphasis added) (reporting remarks of James Madison at the Virginia 
convention). 
 48. Id. at 504 (emphasis added) (reporting remarks of Gov. Randolph at Virginia 
convention). 
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shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or 
inconsistent with the delegated powers.  The treaties they 
make must be under the authority of the United States, to be 
within their province.  It is sufficiently secured, because it 
only declares that, in pursuance of the powers given, they 
shall be the supreme law of the land[.]49 
 
The relevant portion of Article VI—to which Nicholas referred in his 
speech—states that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land[.]”50  
Nicholas viewed this phrase as a restraint on the scope of treaty-making 
authority according to the delegated authority in the Constitution and the 
fundamental concept of federalism.51  Under Nicholas’ view, Article VI 
provided certain substantive limitations on the power.52  The Missouri Court 
viewed this same phrase in Article VI as the formal act of voting on a treaty.  
In particular, the Missouri Court opined: 
 
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when 
made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are 
declared to be so when made under the authority of the 
United States.  It is open to question whether the authority of 
the United States means more than the formal acts 
prescribed to make the convention.53 
 
Not surprisingly, the Missouri Court made this postulation without any 
citation to or support from the debates of the Ratifying Conventions or the 
Founding Fathers, nor any exploration of original intent.  In fact, the 
Missouri Court went on to state that original intent of America’s Founding 
Fathers was not even relevant, stating that the words of the Constitution  
 
called into life a being the development of which could not 
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its 
begetters. . . . The case before us must be considered in the  
light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what 
was said a hundred years ago.54 
                                                
 49. Id. at 507 (emphases added) (reporting remarks of George Nicholas at the Virginia 
convention). 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 51. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 507. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433. 
 54. Id. 
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Despite the Missouri Court’s implication that the Founding Fathers could 
not have foreseen the possibility of treaties interfering with states’ rights, the 
debates in the Virginia Ratifying Convention prove otherwise.  Virginia 
ratified the Constitution only after having answered Henry’s and Mason’s 
objections regarding the treaty power.  Had no one responded to these 
concerns, or if Madison, Randolph, Nicholas, and Corbin added their voices 
in support of Henry and Mason, one must assume that the convention would 
have proceeded on an entirely different course.  Certainly, the exchange 
cannot be over-looked. 
 
B. The North Carolina Convention 
 
In North Carolina’s ratifying convention, some of the delegates made 
objections to the treaty power similar to those made in Virginia.  There, 
however, the objections were not met with the same convincing assurances 
by others.  As a result of this and other objections, North Carolina did not 
ratify the Constitution at its first convention.55 
Mr. Porter was among those in the North Carolina convention who 
objected.  He stated, “Mr. Chairman, there is a power vested in the Senate 
and President to make treaties, which shall be the supreme law of the land.  
Which among us can call them to account? . . . They might give up the rivers 
and territory of the Southern States.”56  Thereafter, Mr. M’Dowall followed 
with more objections:  
 
[P]ermit me, sir, to make a few observations, to show how 
improper it is to place so much power in so few men, 
without any responsibility whatever.  Let us consider what 
number of them is necessary to transact the most important 
business.  Two thirds of the members present, with the 
President, can make a treaty.  Fourteen of them are a 
quorum, two thirds of which are ten.  These ten may make 
treaties and alliances.  They may involve us in any 
difficulties, and dispose of us in any manner, they please.57 
 
                                                
 55. North Carolina’s first ratifying convention is referred to as the Hillsborough 
Convention.  There, the delegates chose not to ratify or to reject the proposed Constitution.  
North Carolina did ratify the Constitution in a second convention held on November 21, 1789, 
after George Washington had been elected President.  The second convention is referred to as 
the Fayetteville Convention.  See Troy L. Kickler, Ratification Debates, N.C. HIST. PROJECT, 
http://www.northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/280/entry/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
 56. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 115 (reporting remarks of Porter at the North 
Carolina convention). 
 57. Id. at 119 (reporting remarks of J. M’Dowall at the North Carolina convention). 
2014 TREATY POWER 97 
 
In response to Porter and M’Dowall, Mr. Davie sought to assure them 
that this power was not a threat because Senators were elected by the state 
legislatures and therefore the Senate would protect the interests of the states.  
He said, 
 
Mr. Chairman, although treaties are mere conventional 
acts between the contracting parties, yet, by the law of 
nations, they are the supreme law of the land to their 
respective citizens or subjects.  All civilized nations have 
concurred in considering them as paramount to an ordinary 
act of legislation. . . .  
. . . .  
On a due consideration of this clause, it appears that this 
power could not have been lodged as safely any where else 
as where it is. . . . As the Senate represents the sovereignty of 
the states, whatever might affect the states in their political 
capacity ought to be left to them.58 
 
But Davie failed to convince the body, as the subsequent comments by 
M’Dowall, Porter, and Mr. Spencer show.  M’Dowall stated that “he was of 
the same opinion as before[,] . . . that giving such extensive powers to so few 
men in the Senate was extremely dangerous[.]”59  Porter added, “My 
objection still remains.  I cannot find it in the least obviated” by Davie’s 
opinion.60  Spencer closed the discussion with his view that 
 
no argument can be used to show that this power is proper.  
If the whole legislative body—if the House of 
Representatives do not interfere in making treaties, I think 
they ought at least to have the sanction of the whole Senate.  
. . . It appears to me that the powers are too extensive, and 
not sufficiently guarded.61 
 
C. The Pennsylvania, South Carolina, New York, and Connecticut 
Conventions 
 
The delegates at the Pennsylvania and South Carolina ratifying 
conventions expressly discussed the treaty power, and in those conventions, 
the representatives made statements and assurances that the treaty power was 
                                                
 58. Id. at 119, 123 (reporting remarks of Davie at the North Carolina convention).   
 59. Id. at 124 (reporting remarks of J. M’Dowall at the North Carolina convention). 
 60. Id. at 125 (reporting remarks of Porter at the North Carolina convention). 
 61. Id. at 131 (reporting remarks of Spencer at the North Carolina convention). 
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subject to other provisions of the Constitution.  In these and other 
conventions, there was also discussion of the republican form of government 
and the preservation of states’ rights.     
During Pennsylvania’s convention, James Wilson stated: 
 
It well deserves to be remarked, that, though the House of 
Representatives possess no active part in making treaties, yet 
their legislative authority will be found to have strong 
restraining influences upon both President and Senate.  In 
England, if the king and his ministers find themselves, during 
their negotiation, to be embarrassed because an existing law 
is not repealed, or a new law is not enacted, they give notice 
to the legislature of their situation, and inform them that it 
will be necessary, before the treaty can operate, that some 
law be repealed, or some be made.  And will not the same 
thing take place here? . . .  
. . . . 
We find, on an examination of all its parts, that the 
objects of this government are such as extend beyond the 
bounds of the particular states.  This is the line of distinction 
between this government and the particular state 
governments. 
. . . It belongs not to this government to make an act for 
any particular township, county, or state.62 
 
As had happened in Virginia, Wilson’s assurances convinced a sufficient 
number of delegates to ratify the Constitution over dissenting objections that 
the Constitution should contain a statement that no “treaties [would] be valid 
which are in contradiction to the constitution of the United States, or the 
constitutions of the several states.”63 
In South Carolina, Rawlins Lowndes observed “that no treaty concluded 
contrary to the express laws of the land could be valid.”64  Lowndes cited to 
Great Britain where “the king of Great Britain had not a legal power to ratify 
any treaty which trenched on the fundamental laws of the country.”65  Ralph 
                                                
 62. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 506–07 (emphases added) (reporting remarks of 
Wilson at the Pennsylvania convention). 
 63. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 241 
(Ralph Ketchum ed., 1986).  
 64. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 271 (reporting remarks of Rawlins Lowndes at 
the South Carolina convention). 
 65. Id. at 308 (reporting remarks of Rawlings Lowndes at the South Carolina Convention). 
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Izard likewise observed that a particular treaty in England had not been 
ratified because it was “found to clash with some laws in existence[.]”66  
John Julius Pringle stated that “[n]o nations would keep treaties” that “violate 
the fundamental laws, and subvert the Constitution, or tend to the destruction 
of the happiness and liberty of the states[.]”67  He said that such treaties 
would not be made with “good faith . . . but by treachery and a betraying of 
trust, and by exceeding the powers with which the makers were 
intrusted[.]”68 
In the New York ratifying convention, R. R. Livingston characterized 
treaties as addressing external matters.  He stated that Senators  
 
are to form treaties with foreign nations.  This requires a 
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics, and an 
extensive acquaintance with characters, whom, in this 
capacity, they have to negotiate with, together with such an 
intimate conception of our best interests, relative to foreign 
powers, as can only be derived from much experience in this 
business.69   
 
Alexander Hamilton remarked: 
 
I wish the committee to remember that the Constitution 
under examination is framed upon truly republican 
principles; and that, as it is expressly designed to provide for 
the common protection and the general welfare of the United 
States, it must be utterly repugnant to this Constitution to 
subvert the state governments, or oppress the people.70 
 
In Connecticut, Oliver Wolcott observed, “[s]o well guarded is this 
Constitution throughout, that it seems impossible that the rights either of the 
states or of the people should be destroyed.”71  Richard Law remarked:  
 
Some suppose that the general government, which 
extends over the whole, will annihilate the state 
                                                
 66. Id. at 268 (reporting remarks of Ralph Izard at the South Carolina Convention). 
 67. Id. at 270 (reporting remarks of John Julius Pringle at the South Carolina Convention) 
(emphasis added). 
 68. Id. (reporting remarks of John Julius Pringle at the South Carolina Convention). 
 69. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 291 (emphases added) (reporting remarks of R. 
R. Livingston at the New York convention). 
 70. Id. at 356 (emphasis added) (reporting remarks of Alexander Hamilton at the New 
York convention). 
 71. Id. at 202 (reporting remarks of Oliver Wolcott at the Connecticut convention). 
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governments.  But consider that this general government 
rests upon the state governments for its support.  It is like a 
vast and magnificent bridge, built upon thirteen strong and 
stately pillars.  Now, the rulers, who occupy the bridge, 
cannot be so beside themselves as to knock away the pillars 
which support the whole fabric.72   
 
Governor Huntingdon stated, “[t]he state governments, I think, will not be 
endangered by the powers vested by this Constitution in the general 
government.”73 
 
D. Other Sources 
 
In addition to the Ratifying Conventions, there is additional evidence 
from other sources that the treaty power is limited by states’ rights.  Joseph 
Story, Justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845 and author of 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, wrote therein: 
 
But, though the [treaty] power is thus general and 
unrestricted, it is not to be so construed, as to destroy the 
fundamental laws of the state.  A power given by the 
constitution cannot be construed to authorize a destruction of 
other powers given in the same instrument.  It must be 
construed, therefore, in subordination to it; and cannot 
supersede, or interfere with any other of its fundamental 
provisions.  Each is equally obligatory, and of paramount 
authority within its scope; and no one embraces a right to 
annihilate any other.  A treaty to change the organization of 
the government, to annihilate its sovereignty, to overturn its 
republican form, or to deprive it of its constitutional powers,  
would be void; because it would destroy, what it was 
designed merely to fulfill, the will of the people.74 
 
In the Federalist No. 45, Madison characterized “external” negotiation as 
part of federal power, whereas the states reserved governance of internal 
affairs: 
 
                                                
 72. Id. at 201 (reporting remarks of Richard Law at the Connecticut convention). 
 73. Id. at 199 (reporting remarks of Gov. Huntingdon at the Connecticut Convention) 
(emphasis added). 
 74. JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 777, 
at 553 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (emphasis added). 
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The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the Federal Government, are few and defined.  Those which 
are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and 
indefinite.  The former will be exercised principally on 
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign 
commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the 
most part, be connected.  The powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary 
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties 
of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State.75 
 
Likewise, in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice, Thomas Jefferson 
set forth prerequisites for a treaty, including that “it must concern the foreign 
nation party to the contract, or it would be mere nullity, res inter alios acta.”76  
He also wrote,  
 
[b]y the general power to make treaties, the Constitution 
must have intended to comprehend only those subjects 
which are usually regulated by treaty, and can not be 
otherwise regulated . . . It must have meant to except out of 
these the rights reserved to the States; for surely the 
President and the Senate can not do by treaty what the whole 
Government is interdicted from doing in any way.”77 
 
Beyond these sources, numerous Founding Fathers wrote and spoke of 
the limited nature of federal authority generally and the retention of state 
power in the proposed Constitution.  By way of two examples, in An 
Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution, Noah 
Webster wrote with emphasis,  
 
[e]very person, capable of reading, must discover, that the 
convention have labored to draw the line between the federal 
and provincial powers—to define the powers of Congress, 
and limit them to those general concerns which must come 
                                                
 75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 227 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2003) (emphases added). 
 76. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 310 (1801).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines res inter alios 
acta alteri nocere non debet as “[t]hings done between strangers ought not to injure those who 
are not parties to them.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (6th ed. 1990). 
 77. JEFFERSON, supra note 76, at 310 (emphasis added). 
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under federal jurisdiction, and which cannot be managed in 
the separate legislatures—that in all internal regulations, 
whether of civil or criminal nature, the states retain their 
sovereignty, and have it guaranteed to them by this very 
constitution.78 
 
In a letter to Marquis de Lafayette, George Washington wrote,  
 
[t]hat the general Government is not invested with more 
Powers than are indispensably necessary to perform the 
functions of a good Government; and, consequently, that no 
objection ought to be made against the quantity of Power 
delegated to it[.]  
. . . .  
. . . It will at least be a recommendation to the proposed 
Constitution that it is provided with more checks and barriers 
against the introduction of Tyranny, [and] those of a nature 
less liable to be surmounted, than any Government hitherto 
instituted among mortals, hath possessed.79 
 
III.  IS THERE ANY HOPE AT ALL THAT SOMEONE WILL FINALLY  
GET IT RIGHT? 
 
While there is a paucity of case law discussing federalist limitations on 
the treaty-making power, a much deeper history of decision-making exists 
with the Commerce Clause.  Commerce Clause jurisdiction is far more 
expansive than originally intended but at least in some limited instances the 
judiciary has taken steps to protect states’ rights.  By way of example, in 
United States v. Lopez,80 the Supreme Court determined that the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense “for any 
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone[,]” exceeds the 
authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause.81  The Court observed 
                                                
 78. NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 31 (Pritchard & Hall 1787) (emphases in original). 
 79. Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (Feb. 7, 1788), in 2 THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, at 179 (The Library of America 1993).  See also TENCH COXE, 
AN EXAMINATION, reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at 
152 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1888) (“Besides the securities for the liberties of the people arising out 
of the federal government, they are guarded by their state constitutions, and by the nature of 
things in the separate states.”). 
 80. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 81. Id. at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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“[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement 
that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.”82  It 
held that “even . . . modern-era precedents which have expanded 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is 
subject to outer limits.”83  And, while 
 
[t]he broad language in these opinions has suggested the 
possibility of additional expansion, . . . we decline here to 
proceed any further [because t]o do so would require us to 
conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does 
not presuppose something not enumerated and that there 
never will be a distinction between what is truly national 
what is truly local.84   
 
In California v. Thompson,85 the Supreme Court held that a California 
statute requiring every transportation agent in the state to obtain a license 
from the State Railroad Commission did not violate the Commerce Clause.86  
The Court stated, “the Commerce Clause, in conferring on Congress power 
to regulate commerce, did not wholly withdraw from the states the power to 
regulate matters of local concern with respect to which Congress has not 
exercised its power, even though the regulation affects interstate 
commerce.”87  
In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas,88 the Supreme Court held that the Texas 
Railroad Commission “did not transcend the limits of the state’s jurisdiction” 
in fixing the rate for domestic gas supplied to distributing companies in 
Texas.89  Similarly, in South Carolina State Highway Department v. 
Barnwell Bros.,90 the Court stated, “[f]rom the beginning it has been 
recognized that a state can, if it sees fit, build and maintain its own highways, 
canals[,] and railroads and that in the absence of Congressional action their 
regulation is peculiarly within its competence, even though interstate 
commerce is materially affected.”91 
Unfortunately, much of constitutional jurisprudence seems driven by 
politics, judicial activism, and—as the Missouri Court stated—the idea that 
                                                
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 556–57.   
 84. Id. at 567–68 (internal citations omitted). 
 85. 313 U.S. 109 (1941). 
 86. See id. at 114. 
 87. Id. at 113.   
 88. 304 U.S. 224 (1938). 
 89. Id. at 241. 
 90. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). 
 91. Id. at 187. 
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the meaning of the Constitution “evolves” over time.92  Only a few decades 
before the New Deal Darby Court reduced the Tenth Amendment to “but a 
truism,”93 the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Colorado94 spoke entirely 
differently of the Tenth Amendment, and much more consistent with original 
intent: 
 
Its principal purpose was not the distribution of power 
between the United States and the states, but a reservation to 
the people of all powers not granted. . . . The people who 
adopted the Constitution knew that in the nature of things 
they could not foresee all the questions which might arise in 
the future, all the circumstances which might call for the 
exercise of further national powers than those granted to the 
United States, and after making provision for an amendment 
to the Constitution by which any needed additional powers 
would be granted, they reserved to themselves all powers not 
so delegated.95  
 
The Kansas Court also cautioned that “[t]his Article X is not to be shorn of 
its meaning by any narrow or technical construction, but is to be considered 
fairly and liberally so as to give effect to its scope and meaning.”96   
Indeed, just thirty years before Missouri, the Supreme Court in 
DeGeofrey v. Riggs97 adopted a more restrained view of the treaty power, 
finding that it was in fact constrained by federalism.  In that case, the Court 
held that a treaty with France superseded the common law related to rules of 
inheritance to allow for French citizens to inherit property.98  This removal of 
disability on inheritance was subject in part to federal control, however, 
because it was limited to “all political communities in the United State where 
legislation permits aliens to hold real estate[.]”99  The Court expressed that 
the treaty power “would not be contended [to] extend[] so far as to authorize 
                                                
 92. See Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433. 
 93. Darby, 312 U.S. at 123–24. 
 94. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
 95. Id. at 90. 
 96. Id. at 90–91. 
 97. 133 U.S. 258 (1890). 
 98. Id. at 266.  A scholar in the early twentieth century observed that “[b]etween 1778 and 
1860 the United States became a party to forty-four treaties containing articles governing the 
acquisition and disposal of real property, situated within its boundaries, by aliens, citizens of 
other signatories, and vice versa.”  Ralston Hayden, The States’ Rights Doctrine and the 
Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 566, 567 (Apr. 1917).  Many or most of these 
treaties recognized state authority in some degree.  Id. at 569. 
 99. DeGeofrey, 133 U.S. at 272. 
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what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government 
or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion of the territory of 
the latter, without its consent.”100 
Not long before Missouri, two separate federal courts struck down 
Congressional statutes related to the protection of migratory birds—United 
States v. McCullagh101 and United States v. Shauver.102  The McCullagh 
court compared the migratory bird statute to other laws, including laws 
related to marriage and divorce, and stated the federal government has 
limitations: 
 
Our national Constitution is one of purely delegated powers.  
. . . . 
. . . [N]o matter how laudable the purpose of Congress in 
the passage of the act in question may have been, or how 
great the ultimate end sought thereby to be attained for the 
common good, such end does not justify the means 
employed, if it be found on examination to lie beyond 
constitutional bounds. . . . 
There can be no doubt but that a uniform system of laws 
on the subjects of marriage and divorce in this country 
would terminate many serious evils and accomplish 
inestimable good.  Had Congress the power to so legislate a 
few comparatively simple provisions would accomplish this 
much desired result.  However, this has been neither done 
nor attempted by Congress.  The same may be said of many 
subject-matters of legislation under our system of 
government lodged in the state, but denied to the nation.  As, 
then, the will of Congress to accomplish the much-desired 
result, without the power of accomplishment, will not  
suffice, no matter how great the exigencies of the case, or 
how impotent the powers of the states to protect may be[.]103 
 
The Shauver court stated: 
 
It may be, as contended on behalf of the government, that 
only by national legislation can migratory wild game and 
fish be preserved to the people, but that is not a matter for 
the courts.  It is the people who alone can amend the 
                                                
 100. Id. at 267. 
 101. 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915). 
 102. 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914). 
 103. McCullagh, 221 F. at 290–91 (emphasis added). 
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Constitution to grant Congress the power to enact such 
legislation as they deem necessary.  All the courts are 
authorized to do when the constitutionality of a legislative 
act is questioned is to determine whether Congress, under 
the Constitution as it is, possesses the power to enact the 
legislation in controversy; their power does not extend to the 
matter of expediency.  If Congress has not the power, the 
duty of the court is to declare the act void.104 
 
The Shauver Court was “unable to find any provision in the Constitution 
authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect 
or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game when in a state, and is 
therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional.”105   
 
IV.  GOING FORWARD 
 
Perhaps very soon our federal government will again test the limits of the 
treaty power, and our Supreme Court will once again have a choice whether 
to adjudicate by original intent—or something else.  Whether it is the 
International Criminal Court, the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, treaties pursuant 
to U.N. Agenda 21, European and international speech laws that would 
infringe on free expression and religious freedom in the United States, or 
something else, that day of decision-making will soon be upon us.  And, I am 
not optimistic. 
Whenever the judiciary steps away from original intent, as it has done in 
so many cases, each is judicial activism and an erosion of the system of 
governance intended by our Founding Fathers.  Each misplaced decision is a 
new “precedential” foundation for another decision even farther askew.  Only 
time will tell how much farther we can go until our government and our way 
of life is unrecognizable in our age or any other of the past.   
But there is hope, at least in theory.  No matter how many steps we take 
away from the Constitution, it is only one step to return.  Ten thousand 
instances of precedent matter not if not one of them has any basis in 
constitutional authority.  They are bursts of air that stand upright really on 
nothing at all.   
The maxim of “limited, enumerated powers” is today but a platitude, a 
cursory preamble to a commonplace judicial rationale entirely devoid of any 
meaningful analysis of original intent and hunched over backward to find 
                                                
 104. Shauver, 214 F. at 160. 
 105. Id. at 160.  See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 342 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he [individual] State is accorded wide latitude in fashioning regulations 
appropriate for protection of its wildlife.”).  
2014 TREATY POWER 107 
 
some way to justify expanding federal authority.  The presumption has been 
for a long time to justify big government somehow, some way, rather than to 
place the onus on the federal government to prove to the people and the 
states that the power it claims to have it actually holds.   
May we remember the words of Governor Huntingdon in the 
Connecticut Ratifying Convention: 
 
I infer that the general government will not have the 
disposition to encroach upon the states.  But still the people 
themselves must be the chief support of liberty.  While the 
great body of freeholders are acquainted with the duties 
which they owe to their God, to themselves, and to men, 
they will remain free.  But if ignorance and depravity should 
prevail, they will inevitably lead to slavery and ruin.106 
 
Remember that our Founding Fathers wisely included in the Constitution 
a means to expand federal authority—and it was not the judiciary.  It was 
through constitutional amendment.  I fear the treaty power is just the next in 
a long line of constitutional principles that will be abused to justify authority 
that quite simply does not exist. 
                                                
 106. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 199–200 (reporting remarks of Gov. 
Huntingdon at the Connecticut Convention). 
